We focus on state aid to the car sector in the EU. Stemming from the general normative principles on state aid (i.e., art. 107 of the Treaty), we investigate how these have been applied, given the specific soft law provisions which are typical of the sector. A detailed quantitative analysis from 1990 to 2008 is carried out, highlighting a reduction of aids over time. A shift to "regional development" motives in granting aid to the sector is observed in the last ten years. Overall, a lack of coordination in national policies documented by large differences in expenditure across countries in the past, and possible future subsidy races, call for a more focussed European policy for aids to this industry. * We would like to thank the participants to the Workshop "The European Union and state aid: the present crisis and beyond" at CCP, UEA, Norwich for helpful comments and Simone Calzoni for excellent research assistantship.
Introduction
Since the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon 2000, the main principle in the European policy towards state aid is synthesized by the expression "less aid, better aid".
The "less" part is quite obvious, while the idea of "better" aid refers to a re-orientation of aid towards "horizontal" objectives (regional, training, …) rather than purely sectoral ones; the reason is that horizontal aid is supposed to deal with market failures (too little spending in R&D or training activities) or with regional problems, while sector-specific aid is feared to distort the allocation of resources. However, the competence of the Commission on state aid is limited to a mere control of what member states do, banning aid which is deemed incompatible with the common market (in the sense specified by the Treaty, article 107), but without pursuing an explicit pro-active policy (a "strategy").
This raises at least two issues. First of all, one needs to evaluate the combined effect of decentralised decisions and of a central control. How effective is this control? Can it really abstract from a strategy? And is it sufficient to turn national policies into a consistent European picture? Second, the relationship between a strict rule and the numerous existing exceptions is puzzling. How can control be effective if the general principle can be circumvented in so many ways? And what is the best way to safeguard the principle (assuming that principle is actually worth defending)?
The analysis of state aid to the car sector appears particularly relevant at least given the industry's prominence in the policy debate 1 The attention of the member states (and hence of the Commission) to the car sector is such, that two specific framework agreements for state aid to the sector exist. Although subsidies to this industry cannot be compared to those given to agriculture, financial services or transport, they are certainly large relative to other manufacturing sectors, and their distortive effect on competition and on the EU integration 1 The sector is subject to an immense number and variety of regulations on safety, emissions standards, and so on. According to the producers' association (Acea), the automotive industry has to comply to more than 80 EU Directives and 115 international framework agreements. These standards have become stricter and stricter over time. Even in competition policy, the car sector is given special attention in the field of vertical restraints (see the block exemption regulation BER 1400/2002) because producers' concentration is such, that the concern for competition is particularly acute.
process is not negligible. Indeed, in many EU countries there is a national car producer: a subsidy given to a national champion in troubles can easily determine an aid war among EU member states, with negative relevant effects on the integration process 2 .
In this paper we focus on the state aid policy towards the sector in the EU, starting from an analysis of data we collect, and trying to assess how the interplay of member states' policies and EC control have worked to shape what has happened. It emerges that, absent an explicit strategy at EU level, a considerable amount of money is given to the sector, with large likely inefficiencies, whereby capacity is decreased in certain states and increased elsewhere, both things thanks to public money. Moreover, the EU control over state aid to the sector has shown to be effective only at times, highlighting that refusing the idea that the EU should have a clear industrial strategy may lead to inefficient outcomes.
Our analysis is performed on an original data-set we built collecting state aid cases to the car sector directly from the EU Official Journal (for the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] and from the EU State Aid Scoreboard (from 2000 on). Although many ways to support the industry are not included among official state aid figures, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to measure the phenomenon. Over time, we observe a slowdown in the amount of aid granted. Additionally, from 2000 onwards, aid to the industry has been increasingly devised as regional development aid. Large disparities emerge among states in the adoption of this instrument, with Germany, Italy and new member states acting as most generous donors.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some general features of the car sector, especially in the EU context. In Section 3 we first present the specific frameworks adopted for the car sector and we then illustrate how the EU system has worked, using the available data. In Section 4 we investigate member states' behaviour in the framework of international competition. Section 5 analyzes the relationship between state aid control and industrial policy, with a particular focus on the recent crisis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 See about Section 5 below.
The car sector in Europe
Within the European Union, the gross output of this industry has constantly increased over time, but uniquely because of new accessions, while employment has remained almost stable in the last thirty years, again thanks to the contribution of New Member States. As for the relevance of the sector in national economies, notice that the figures usually provided include direct motor vehicles production as well as most of the components.
Defined in this way 3 , the automotive industry employs more than two million workers in the European Union (EU25), which constitute around 7% of the manufacturing industries'
workforce and about 1% of total employment. The weight of the car industry over the EU economy in terms of employees has constantly declined since the Seventies, when it used to represent almost 2% of the total workforce. This decline is consistent with the shift towards services which has characterized Europe in the last thirty years. Nonetheless, the relative share of the car industry within manufacturing has slightly increased over time, thus suggesting that the decline has been more severe for other manufacturing industries.
When we move from direct employment (including components) to an estimate of the number of jobs which indirectly depend on this sector, statistics become a lot less reliable, as the definition of indirect links among sectors is less obvious. Some "partisan" estimates provided by the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) suggest that indirect jobs related to the industry amount to 10 millions (ACEA, 2009 Commission has tried to redress over time, in particular reacting to member states' waves of subsidies in periods of economic crisis. This was apparent for the car sector at the beginning of the Eighties, when the oil shock and the subsequent recession gave rise to a real subsidy race (Dancet and Rosenstock, 1995) ; a similar race happened between 1993 and 1996.
The Commission's reactions led to documents labelled "frameworks", the first of which dates back to 1989, while the second was issued in 1997. The 1989 "Community framework for state aid to the motor vehicle industry" (OJ C 123, 18.5.1989 ) represents the first systematic attempt to organize state aid analysis in a way, to make it compatible with a harmonic development of competition in the sector. Coming after a real subsidy race, its first aim was to increase the transparency of state aid to the sector, and to specify some conditions, which the EC may ask to allow specific subsidies. As for transparency, the framework envisages an obligation for member states to notify i) all proposed aid schemes outside already approved schemes, and ii) those schemes within approved schemes if the total cost of the project is above the threshold of 12 Million Ecu; moreover, the framework includes an invitation to inform the Commission about all aid decisions, to be collected in a final annual report.
Some conditions for allowing state aid were also introduced. First of all, the framework introduced the idea that the EC should monitor that the aid does not help increase the market share, and it states that in some cases capacity cuts may be required. As for aid schemes referring to specific objectives, the framework already introduces a positive attitude towards regional aid, limits the possibility to use R&D as an excuse to subsidize any technological improvement (with a clear distinction between R&D spending and the mere introduction of new technologies), and specifying that training aid could be allowed per se if not linked to new investments.
While Spain and Germany had originally opposed its application, other countries agreed and at the end the framework was put in place, and extended until further review.
However, after 1993 a sharp demand drop brought about a new subsidy race, and new controls were considered necessary. At the same time, the evolution of general state aid policy made it necessary to update the framework.
This led to the second framework, which was issued in 1997 (OJ C 279/1 15.09.1997).
This scheme broadly reflects a general evolution in state aid control, and in many respects simply introduces in the sectoral discipline the principles, which in the meantime had been developed in evaluating, for instance, training aid, regional aid or the aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. This is particularly true in the evaluation of regional development aid, which now requires among other things something reasonably close to a cost-benefit analysis, including the proof that a viable alternative exists, so that -absent the subsidy -the firm would develop the same project elsewhere.
An analogous evolution is marked by the "Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects" which was adopted shortly afterwards (December 1997) and later reviewed in 2002. The coexistence of this framework with the sectoral one raises some question marks, especially given that the size of firms in the sector usually implies that investment projects fall within the scope of "large investment" frameworks.
Besides this, a major evolution is provided by the Lisbon declaration, which can be synthesized -as already mentioned -in the formula "less aid, better aid". Although we will see in the following pages to what extent these principles have found an actual application in the policy towards the car sector, it is important to acknowledge that especially the second part was quite in line with the EC tradition. Although the Treaty accepts aid directed towards "certain economic activities" (e.g., certain sectors), the preference for horizontal interventions, aimed at more general objectives such as regional development or better training, was already present in the first framework on the car sector. However, as we will see, the explicit objective contained in the final Lisbon declaration has led to a real shift in policy, such that aid labelled as "sectoral" has almost disappeared. 
The data
To answer this question we have collected a considerable amount of data, using the state aid register of the DG Competition 10 for cases after 2000, and carefully checking the Official Journal, annual issues of the Report on competition policy and various EU documents for previous years. Publicly available information varies in quality over time.
Early documents are less systematic and less generous of information than current ones, which have a much greater transparency and precision. Before 1988 the information appears to become really occasional and not reliable, so that our "backwards" search has stopped at that year.
We have focussed on the amount granted, on the basis of the final decision published in the Official Journal of the European Communities 11 . We report data on the total nominal amount granted. Whenever possible, we also kept the information on the discounted 10 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/. 11 Notice that the amounts granted often differ from the amounts proposed. values 12 . When considering soft loans, we take the data on the gross grant equivalent. If this value is not officially provided, we have computed it on the basis of the spread between the required interest rate (which could be nil) and the interest rate of the ECB for its main financing operations, as reported monthly in the Official Journal. All values reported in the tables are expressed in Euro/ECU. If the amount is reported in the official documentation in the national currency only, the exchange rate adopted is the annual average (data from Eurostat).
Since a decision on a state aid may take several years, it is difficult to choose a year of reference. We choose to attribute an aid to the year of the final decision, and not to the year in which the case was opened. This general principle has an exception for cases in which the aid was granted before the decision, as in these cases we attribute the aid (if approved)
to the year in which it was paid. The rationale is that we are interested in the time period in which the aid has been granted, either with or without a formal approval. Finally, we also consider the information on the instrument adopted (grant, soft loan, etc.), and (especially for recent cases) the type of "primary objective" stated in the decision.
Thus, the data we present here refer to approved aid -i.e., aid the EC has declared compatible with the Treaty -and which is explicitly devoted to the car sector. Notice that even when state aid is "primarily" targeted to horizontal objectives, it may be explicitly earmarked to a specific sector or firm, and we include in our database only those amounts which have been reserved to one or more firms in the sector (whichever the horizontal objective which justifies the scheme).
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Notice that our data underestimate the total support effectively granted to the sector. At least three things are missing. First of all, only aid measures explicitly earmarked to the car sector are included, while some car producers may have received aid under horizontal programmes which were previously approved as general measures, and which had been targeted to many sectors (and not specifically to one). In the same way, although demand subsidies (e.g., scrapping incentives) do not formally represent state aid as the money is given to consumers, they are nonetheless granted specifically to support the sector.
However, the total amount effectively devoted to these subsidies is not systematically recorded. Finally, the European Investment Bank (EIB) is sometimes asked to target its funds to specific sectors, but these specific programmes have not been accounted for.
Total aid amounts: less aid?
Since 2000, the general approach of the Commission (and even more of the European Council) has been to aim at reducing state subsidies and at inducing better targeting of resources ("less aid, better aid"). Let us start from an analysis of whether it is legitimate to say that -according to some criterion -aid to the car sector has actually decreased in the last few years. Our data show that state aid in EU 12 (or 15) has indeed decreased over time in absolute terms. While in the Nineties it was not uncommon to see hundreds of Millions paid out every year, in the following decade total values have rarely reached the previous peaks. Notice that as early data are likely to be much more accurate than older ones, the decrease in state aid is probably even greater than we can report here. Moreover, as we will later see in greater detail, if one looks at some of the main cases after 2000, some of the largest ones refer to new accession countries or to former East Germany Länder. Probably, this is partly because new countries are often characterised by a larger presence of areas eligible for regional aid, and partly for an explicit effort to favour the integration of these countries in the EU.
To make the analysis more precise, one should consider that state subsidies are likely to depend on the actual levels of economic activity, so that these changes should first of all be considered in proportion of the size of the sector. Moreover, changes in subsidy levels could be related to demand shifts, in order to see whether the apparent decrease in subsidies has been due to an improvement of market conditions after 2000. To these ends, for each year we consider, on the one hand, the ratio between the amounts of state aid and the number of employees (a proxy of the size of the sector) 14 , and on the other hand, the number of new car registrations as an indicator of demand. A simple investigation of Figure   1 indicates that over time state aid has indeed decreased, and that probably demand shifts explains a good deal of the dynamics. 10.500.000
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In any case, although this might be interpreted as an actual disengagement of state interventions from the sector, in reality this probably mainly witnesses a shift in policy instruments, from direct subsidies to firms to demand incentives (prizes to scrapping of old cars), which, being formally reserved to consumers, are not considered state aid.
These schemes are now quite common, and they are allowed without problems as long as they are not discriminatory. Notice that, given that they are not controversial at least within the EC, through these schemes member states commit amounts, which are far larger than those previously given as state aid.
Better aid or better packaging ?
Having commented on the total aid amounts, one has to see whether the shift in policy which was marked by the Lisbon declaration has actually proved effective as for the "quality" of aid. Has this managed to improve the targeting of these subsidies? To find an answer, it is first of all useful to consider in greater detail the decisions behind the data synthesized in Table 1 . Looking at the EC decisions, it appears quite obvious that while sectoral aid was the declared goal of most state aid in the Nineties, this is no longer true since 2000, when justifications such as sectoral aid or aid to investments magically disappear, and regional aid suddenly becomes by far the most important declared objective of the state aid targeted to the car sector.
This is the combination of two facts. The first one is that even before that date, aid was very often granted to plants, which in fact were located in assisted regions. However, given that the indication of the "primary objective" of the aid was not crucial, sometimes member states simply used "sectoral development" as a generic term, trusting that anyway their analyses would have been based on the actual location of the plant, on the specification of the assisted R&D project, etc.
The second one is that the EC has anyway accepted the idea that regional development policies could go through aid schemes which, instead of being anonymous or at least open to many firms, were meant for specific plants of specific sectors only. This interpretation of regional policy, although totally standard for many years, is far from obvious. Can we really talk about "horizontal" state aid, when the aid is not generically meant for an area, but when it is targeted to a specific plant, which happen to be located in that area?
Therefore, the shift to aid measures which had a declared "primary" objective of horizontal nature has not changed the possibility of member states to target these measures in a very precise and specific way.
Coming to more recent cases, it is interesting to analyze them in greater detail. Notice that our dataset only considers aid measures, which are explicitly earmarked to the car sector. This notwithstanding -see Table 2 above -the main primary objectives which motivate aid to car plants are regional development, training and R&D. The regional development objective is associated to the largest number of cases (30), and to 75% of the total amount of aid granted to the sector in the period considered (around 1,7 bn €). The training objective records 28 cases, but the total amount granted under this heading is quite guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid, to assess whether they would be "capable of restoring long term viability of the firm within a reasonable timescale and that the aid is limited to the minimum necessary and does not unduly distort competition" 15 . It is interesting to note that this aid was authorised under the condition of a "production-salescap": FSO should limit its annual production to 150 000 units until February 2011.
Member states and competition
Let us now discuss some of the determinants of state aid to the car sector, considering first the international aspect of state aid and competition, and then coming to issues of internal EU relationships.
The US factor: federal versus state subsidies
One of the main arguments in favour of state interventions is that "other countries do the same"; this is the likely starting point of subsidy races, and it is important to analyse to what extent the general EC leniency towards the car sector is justified as a retaliation vis à vis other countries' policies. with a production over 9 million motor vehicles, followed by GM with 8. It is really hard to compare these figures to EU equivalents. In the first place, notice that the relevant concept in the EU is the "gross grant equivalent", which is obvious when aid takes up the form of a direct grant, less so in case of loan guarantees, and even less in case of equity participations. In the second place, notice that in all of these cases the federal authority acquired such a stake in the companies bailed out that a significant part of the actual control of these companies de facto fell in public hands, one thing which almost never occurred in the EU. In other terms, in the US we seem to have a two-tier system. Direct federal interventions are confined to large rescue and restructuring operations, so far directed to one or more of the "big three", managed by the Government with criteria, which seem to be comparable to those followed by private investors. On the other hand, state interventions seem to be perceived and analyzed mainly as issues of regional development, and not so much as competition policy problems. Notice that these funds go to a very large extent to new entrants, which are mainly EU and Asian firms.
A focus of EU member states
In the international state aid game, EU member states act quite independently under the control of the European Commission. Let us now see how different member states have operated in this period, looking at the car sector data reported in Table 3 . In terms of total amount, the most generous countries have been Germany and Italy, which together cover more than 43% of the total amount of aid granted in the period 2000-08 to the sector, followed by the UK with more than 200 M€. France -quite surprisingly given the high number of car plants there located -shows a low total amount of nominal aid to the sector, overcome even by Belgium. Not surprisingly, the newest EU member countries play a particularly relevant role, even if they were not present throughout the period considered. Since their accession, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic have granted together aids to the sector for almost 600 M€. It is clear that the accession of previously centrally managed economies has determined a wave of subsidies to the car plants there located: a further evidence is provided by the fact that the very high total amount of aids by Germany is mainly driven by the huge subsidy (about 363 M€) granted to the new BMW plant located in East Germany (Leipzig) in 2002.
If we scale total aid by the number of employees -as we see in the last column in Table   3 above -we observe however that Germany does not emerge as the most generous country. In the "old Europe", Italy sticks out as a record donor, and it is the only EU12 country which is comparable in terms of state aid to Romania or Slovakia.
National champions and employment concern
In the EU, the terms of the game are quite clear. Member states, under pressure by industrial lobbies, trade unions, local communities or other, try to pay firms substantial subsidies, while the EC tries to set criteria and put order in the matter. The effectiveness of the Commission's efforts is not always clear, but as we will later see some successes must be acknowledged.
The reasons why member states engage in such policies are typically related to the idea that governments support "special" firms sometimes called "national champions". These firms are traditionally "national" firms which have a long and established relationship with the local government, and which are supposed to have a special attention to national interest, and in particular to employment in less developed areas of the country, in exchange for continuing public support.
Notice however that with the development of financial markets the nationality of the control shareholder is more and more difficult to identify. In the same way, the increasing economic integration favours the presence of multinationals which may not be "national" firms in any sense, but which may nonetheless be able to significantly contribute to local employment.
Another way to pose the question is to observe that any subsidy has potential consequences on competition, but "which" competition is the most relevant one to member states' policies? While the main and more widely discussed aspect is competition among firms, the type of competition which is affected in the most direct way is the one among different regions of the EU, competing in order to attract investments and protect jobs. Are governments focused on protecting national champions, or rather any car manufacturer which creates employment within national boundaries? The answer is not easy, as the two things often coincide, but the existence of national champions does not represent a necessary condition to grant public support.
A relatively instructive story is the one of Italy, where the car industry basically consists of one large company, employing directly almost 70,000 people. Fiat is one of the main recipients of state aid in Europe of the last few years, and the timing of the aid measures has been quite independent of business cycles, even more so if one considers applications which were eventually rejected, which shows the determination to help a firm, quite beyond what local and contingent conditions would call for. For instance, six planned measures were notified in 1997, and two of them (regional aid) have been blocked by the EC. In both cases, the regional aid was being claimed for projects in an area which had been declared eligible for assistance under Article 107 (3)(c) justified by the attempt to defend less than 10,000 jobs (out of almost 580,000 jobs in Belgian manufacturing), it would be even harder to explain it as an attempt to defend a US company, that can hardly qualify as a national champion… Or maybe this simply means that for some states the very notion of national champion is no longer linked to traditional brands or to the nationality of the control shareholders, but rather (more pragmatically) to whether a firm is really interested in creating employment in a certain region.
Analogous considerations hold for almost all countries, which do not have established national producers (new member states such as Romania, Poland, …) or which do not have them any more (the United Kingdom). However, notice that whenever a country does have one or more national firm of long tradition (France, Germany or Italy), the bias towards these national champions remains a clear feature of these subsidy policy. 21 Other countries which never had them (or which lost them in the way, e.g. Britain) have shown to be ready to defend whoever is ready to create employment within their boundaries.
The EU aid policy between control and strategy
What should a EU policy towards state aid consist of? The economic literature has clearly showed (since the seminal model by Brander and Spencer, 1985) that subsidies to national firms competing in an international market typically lead to a reduction in social welfare if other countries adopt a similar policy. Moreover, state aid has negative effects on market integration -as theoretically highlighted by Martin and Valbonesi (2008) - neutralizing the exit of the less efficient firms (i.e.: the concentration effect of the integration process) and this would, in turn, destroy an efficient specialization of production and division of labour in the enlarged market. Moreover, in countries where subsidies are granted, X-inefficiency can arise: there is no reason to expect that the winner picked by each national government will be the most efficient firm among those which are in troubles. 21 The French case is somehow peculiar, in that the money officially transferred to firms in the sector appears so limited, to make one wonder whether this is not the produce of a particularly national policy, aimed at promoting apparently general programmes, which only "in practice" are used in support to specific sectors. Indeed, France has been as active as other countries in the state aid arena, and in particular has been one of the main providers of sectoral and ad hoc aid in the EU at least until 2004 (see the data available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/stat_tables.html#5).
And if this is the case, in a general equilibrium setting where different goods are produced, the disparity in treatment for those firms belonging to different sectors is likely to be welfare-reducing at national level.
Even worse, considering the issue of financing of state aid, Collie (2000) shows that each national government has the incentives to grant state aids whereas the prohibition of subsidies would increase the welfare of all member states. Finally, Seabright and
Dewatripont (2006) present EU evidence -and theoretically show -that wasteful state aid can be granted by national politicians to improve their chances of re-election by signalling their commitment to supplying public goods.
In practice, however, the EC only has the power to restrain what member states do, with the presumption (clearly spelled out in the Treaty) that aid is primarily a competition problem, and that it is in general distortive. However, the Treaty itself acknowledges that aid may be acceptable if primarily devoted to especially sensitive aims (regional development, R&D, training, etc.) and if it does not interfere "too much" with competition.
In this perspective, two questions arise. The first one is whether the EC controls have proved effective in this direction. The second one is whether, in so doing, the EC pursues (or should pursue) something which could be labelled a "strategy". Let us tackle the two issues in turn.
Effective controls of fig leaves?
One way of analyzing the effectiveness of the EU policy is to see whether the Lisbon qualitative targets have been met, and in this respect the answer is mixed. We do have less aid "earmarked" to the car sector, and most of it is now justified by regional or training objectives, but probably this is only a facade. However, the real problem is whether these controls have really managed to strike a reasonable balance between the conflicting objectives assigned to the Commission.
To explore the issue, it is useful to examine how state aid given to the car industry for the main horizontal objectives (i.e., training and regional development, in the 2000-08 period) have been analysed and evaluated by the EC. Starting from the training objective, notice that the usual issue the Commission should assess is the nature of training activities to be financed. If such activities are normally carried out by car producers, the aid would be equivalent to operating aid -thus, distorting competition -and should be prohibited. If training activities qualify as "additional", going beyond what normal market considerations would imply, the aid should be considered compatible with the Treaty. It is clear that such an assessment is not an easy task, particularly in an innovative sector, where firms compete through the introduction of new models, and innovation is thus a basic element of their survival. Notice that in many of the cases considered, the assessment is based on arguments such as increasing employability of workers concerned, or job creation or preservation.
Aids given under the heading "regional development" appear to raise potentially greater concern, as they fund expansions in productive capacity which have a direct impact on competition. Given that competition in the sector is at least continental if not global, the benefit from state aid to a plant located in a less developed region should be -at leasttraded off against the possible distortions to the competitive process. The first effect is likely to be on the competitors' profits, which has to do with a direct concern for a level playing field. Moreover, the reallocation of rents in the sector can reduce other firms' efforts in the aim to pursue profit and, consequently, the positive effects from competition among firms. Finally, if there is already excess capacity in the sector, helping new plants might create serious problems to plants elsewhere in the EU.
The assessment of aid pursuing regional development objectives controls for the increase in the beneficiary's production capacity and market share induced by the aid.
According to the guidelines on regional aid, the capacity created through the aid should remain below 5% of the apparent consumption of the product at stake in the European economic area and the beneficiary's market share must remain below 25% in all relevant product markets. Are these thresholds defined correctly for a sector like the car one where words, the test is willing to propose common principles to evaluate each case, provided the subsidy alleviates the effects of a market failure ("efficiency objective") or produces outcomes which increase social/regional cohesion ("equity objective"). As highlighted by Neven et al. (2008) , the test has been mainly implemented in the evaluation of state aid cases the area of R&D, innovation aid and in the provision of risk capital. To our knowledge, this test has never been applied to evaluate state aid cases in the car sector. (again) hard to tell.
Controls without a strategy?
The pure control power can be thought as a "negative" power, not meant to shape industrial policy at EU level. This is broadly consistent with the idea that real sector "micro" policies are prerogatives of the member states. In line with this idea, the 1997 framework on the car industry clearly states that "The Commission does not intend, however, to impose an industrial strategy on the sector". However, this statement looks quite extraordinary, especially since it is quickly followed by the acknowledgment that in assessing rescue and restructuring aid "As structural overcapacity in the motor vehicle industry is set to continue… the Commission will usually require a reduction in installed capacity". It is hard to conceive an intervention conditional on an adjustment in productive capacity, which is not related to an industrial strategy.
What is a "strategy"? The term is somehow ambiguous. If it were to mean simply a behaviour guided by the pursuit of a goal, the banal answer would be that any rational being does have a strategy. The notion of "industrial" strategy -which the EC refuses to admit -probably refers instead to something more extreme, namely to a behaviour inspired to a relative precise idea of how the sector should look like in the future.
It appears quite clear that the Commission does pursue a strategy, both as regards the industry, and as regards other aspects of aid policy, such as regional development. In this direction, for instance, the Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013 (2006/C 54/08) state that "regional aid should be granted under a multi-sectoral aid scheme which forms an integral part of a regional development strategy with clearly defined objectives".
This means that the Commission takes the liberty of evaluating whether aid measures are part of a strategy, whose objectives should be clearly specified. Although it would seem that these objectives will not be discussed, this is hardly believable. In a sense, the reason is almost obvious, however, as member states' act in their own interest, and the Commission does not have the authority to deny such aid if, for instance, the project targets a less developed region of the EU. However, what is the point of making state aid in a country conditional on capacity reductions, when capacity increases are being subsidized in the country next door, remains to be explained.
State aid in time of crisis
These contradictions explode in the period of the real crisis of [2009] [2010] . Notice that the declared trend at the beginning of the crisis was towards greater transparency of State aid, but also towards a reduction in the administrative burden of state aid policy. The "modernization" of state aid policies and the introduction of the Global block exemptions 22 One may object that capacity expansion is likely to decrease prices, and is thus in the interest of consumers, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of competition policy. A thorough assessment of the rationale behind such which was probably a necessary tool, but it has allowed (and is allowing) member states to grant aid with even fewer controls. In particular, an often underestimated consequence of these exemptions from the duty to notify aid and to provide details about the implementation of the schemes and the actual beneficiaries is that actual amounts of total aid for the years 2009-10 will be possible to calculate only in very aggregate terms.
This general trend has had a particular impact on the car sector, which has been singled out as a "strategic" sector by many countries. The Commission's approach to these claims by the member states has been relatively generous, explicitly defending "a proactive stance to support the industry". 24 Although probably inevitable under the circumstances, this has paved the way to a number of specific interventions "to improve access to credit, to clarify the rules for granting state aid in the particular circumstances, to boost the demand for new vehicles through coordinated national action".
The real battle has been to minimize sectoral aids and in favour to horizontal measures.
Again, some success must be acknowledged. In particular, the French attempt to introduce a scheme of state guarantees only meant for car producers and with clear discriminatory features in favour of French brands has been stopped, forcing the French government to transform it into a non-discriminatory horizontal scheme (N23/2009). 25 However, it is unclear whether this formal success is a real one in that the application of such schemes is highly non transparent and that in practice, instead of limiting the use of state aid these changes may have extended (in France and elsewhere) the amount of state intervention.
Finally, notice that official State aid does not exhaust the policies directly targeted to the sector, particularly in the crisis period. A first, major example is given by the mandate These incentives have been adopted for instance by France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, and although they are considered subsidies to consumers and not to firms, they anyway entailed public resources for a sum total of almost 4 bn € among these five countries, all devoted to boosting demand in this specific sector.
26
Although it is still widely recognized that the sector needs restructuring and that excess capacity is widespread, European governments keep pouring money into the sector in order to artificially support employment. The end of the crisis will most likely entail a total reconsideration of these policies.
Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that in practice what qualifies as state aid to a specific sector may be difficult to trace, hidden under declarations that the primary objective of the aid is horizontal. The EU control system on state aid has become progressively more costly given the enlargement of the European market to the new accession countries: specifically referring to the car sector, where firms face international competition, one might ask what is the rationale for the EU control over national subsidies. Moreover, specific programmes aimed at boosting demand in the car sector (e.g., scrapping incentives) may entails even larger amounts of public money, but in fact, strictly speaking, not represent state aid.
However, over time figures on state aid are reduced, partly because of the EC controls, partly because demand conditions have improved (at least, until 2008), and partly, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/news/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/22_04_09bud09_completereport_2591.pdf 26 The German and Spanish programmes had a budget limit of 1,5 bn€ and 100M€, respectively, while in France and in the UK there was only a forecast (of 380 M€ and 300 M£, respectively). In Italy the estimated net cost for the public budget was 1,2 bn€, but a more plausible estimate ex-post is about 1,7 bn€. The actual impact of these incentives schemes on the environment is highly dubious. For instance, Sinn (2009) claims that the energy balance of the German scrapping scheme is most likely negative.
probably, because members states have become smarter and design aid policies which often circumvent official definitions and controls.
The crisis has made controls more lax, and the problems of the sector more acute.
Unfortunately, it has also made restructuring less likely. State aid is very high on the agenda, while member states should acknowledge that purely national policies appear less and less adequate. The market is at least European, within the EU trade is on the increase and so is foreign direct investment, so that in most countries producers are no longer "national champions" and have often shifted production plants abroad. This has made competition among regions more important to national governments than competition among firms. While state aid has been considered a competition policy problem in the EU, the US example stresses that subsidies to industries may well be considered primarily a regional policy issues. As national champions are no longer confined within the original national borders, it may be time to consider a different approach.
However, this does not decrease the importance of coordinating national or regional policies. Subsidy races appear to be equally likely, and they probably entail a considerable waste of public money. A rational approach should definitely call for a European effort to help the restructuring of the sector. Spending public money to help downsizing, while we spend even more money elsewhere to encourage new plants cannot be part of a rational approach to the problem.
